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Abstract 
We comment on two papers on social referencing and social appraisal. We agree with Walle 
et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭ6Ϳ aƌguŵeŶt that at oŶe leǀel of aŶalǇsis, soĐial ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg aŶd soĐial appƌaisal 
aƌe fuŶĐtioŶallǇ eƋuiǀaleŶt: IŶ ďoth Đases, aŶotheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s eŵotioŶal expression is 
oďseƌǀed aŶd this eǆpƌessioŶ iŶfoƌŵs the oďseƌǀeƌ͛s oǁŶ eŵotioŶal ƌeaĐtioŶs aŶd ďehaǀioƌ. 
However, we also agree with Clément and Dukes͛ ǀieǁ that ;at aŶotheƌ leǀel of aŶalǇsisͿ, 
there is an important difference between social referencing and social appraisal. We also 
argue that they are likely to occur at different stages of emotion process.  
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Social referencing and social appraisal: Commentary on the Clément and Dukes (2016) and 
Walle et al. (2016) papers 
We welcome the attention paid in these two papers to social aspects of the emotion 
process. Social referencing and social appraisal are by definition processes that entail the 
presence (usually physical, sometimes imagined) of one or more others. Despite the fact 
that this is the typical set of circumstances in which emotions are experienced (Shaver, Wu 
& Schwartz, 1992; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986), this inherently social setting is not one that 
features prominently in the psychological research on emotion (Fischer & van Kleef, 2010). 
 
There is much that we like in each paper and several points that could be pursued, but here 
we focus on the similarities and differences between social appraisal and social referencing, 
which is the main point of disagreement between the two sets of authors. Whereas Walle 
and colleagues ƌegaƌd soĐial ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg aŶd soĐial appƌaisal as ͚ĐoteƌŵiŶous͛, CléŵeŶt aŶd 
Dukes regard social referencing as a special case of social appraisal. Each position is 
defensible. 
 
A first point worth noting is that there is general agreement between the two sets of 
authors about what social appraisals are: the appraisal by an individual of otheƌs͛ emotional 
reactions to a stimulus or event, which then informs the individual͛s oǁŶ eŵotioŶs aŶd 
behaviors. We agree with Walle et al.͛s positioŶ that soĐial ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg aŶd soĐial appƌaisal 
aƌe ͚fuŶĐtioŶallǇ eƋuiǀaleŶt͛ in the sense that in both cases an emotional response is shaped 
by witnessing one or more otheƌs͛ appƌaisals of the same event. Moreover, these authors 
have a case when they argue that theorists have tended to use the two terms 
interchangeably. They point out that ͚soĐial appƌaisal͛ was used by Campos and Stenberg 
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(1981) in one of the earliest publications on what came to be referred to as social 
referencing. Similarly, social appraisal theorists (ourselves included; Manstead & Fischer, 
2001) often refer to the social referencing literature in explaining what they mean by social 
appraisal.  
 
We also endorse Walle et al.͛s implicit argument that we should avoid making fine 
distinctions between concepts and constructs that are at some level equivalent. However, 
we also agree with Clément and Dukes͛ argument that we should avoid using the same 
terms to refer to underlying processes that differ in some important respect(s). In the view 
of the latter authors, a Đƌiteƌial attƌiďute of soĐial ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg is that the ͚kŶoǁeƌ͛ 
(prototypically a ĐaƌegiǀeƌͿ eŶgages iŶ ͚osteŶsiǀe͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, intentionally 
communicating to the uncertain child whether it is safe or unsafe to cross to the deep side 
of the cliff, or to engage in interaction with a stranger. They propose that this is a special 
case of a more general process of social appraisal, which in turn is a sub-type of a still more 
geŶeƌal pƌoĐess of ǁhat theǇ Đall ͚affeĐtiǀe soĐial leaƌŶiŶg.͛ In their view the key difference 
between social referencing and other forms of social appraisal is whether the knower seeks 
to inform or influence the learner. In social referencing the knower intends to influence the 
learner. In ͚affeĐtiǀe oďseƌǀatioŶ͛, on the other hand, the learner simply observes the 
knower interacting with a person or object, and makes evaluative inferences about the 
latter on the ďasis of the kŶoǁeƌ͛s eǆpƌessiǀe ďehaǀioƌ. Both social referencing and affective 
observation aƌe iŶstaŶĐes of ǁhat CléŵeŶt aŶd Dukes Đall ͚soĐial appƌaisal.͛  
 
The question is whether this distinction between social referencing and affective 
observation is one that is scientifically useful. In answering this question, it is worth 
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considering the two central panels of Figure 2 in the Clément and Dukes paper, because 
these capture what these authors regard as the key process differences between the two 
constructs. In one case, social referencing, the learner interacts with a stimulus that gives 
rise to uncertainty, or even anxiety. The knower monitors this interaction and deliberately 
modulates it by engaging in ostensive communication. In the case of affective observation, 
the knower interacts with a stimulus that generates emotionally expressive behavior in the 
knower without any explicit intention to communicate this to the learner; the learner 
observes this interaction and draws an inference about the emotional qualities of the 
stimulus. 
 
This distinction is, we think, conceptually clear and is likely to be important in understanding 
the role played by emotional expressions in social learning. Take a child who interacts for 
the first time with another child who belongs to a different ethnic group. The first child may 
ďe uŶĐeƌtaiŶ aŶd look to his oƌ heƌ Đaƌegiǀeƌ. The latteƌ͛s sŵiles eŶĐouƌage the Đhild to 
interact with the outgroup child. The adult thereby actively teaches the child a ͚lesson͛ 
about the emotional value of outgroup members. Contrast this with a situation in which a 
child witnesses his or her caregiver interacting warily with an adult who is a member of a 
diffeƌeŶt ethŶiĐ gƌoup, aŶd ŵakiŶg a Ŷegatiǀe eǆpƌessioŶ ďehiŶd the otheƌ adult͛s ďaĐk 
when the interaction is over. Here the adult unwittingly teaches the child a lesson about the 
emotional value of outgroup members. These two sets of circumstances differ in significant 
respects (not least in terms of the implications for interventions). 
 
However, if we were to focus on the value of this distinction for understanding how 
emotional experience and behavior are influenced by others, we might arrive at a different 
Manstead and Fischer  Social referencing and social appraisal  
   
   
  6 
conclusion. To understand the way in which social influences operate on the emotion 
process, it makes little difference whether the leaƌŶeƌ͛s emotional response to a stimulus is 
shaped by being actively steered by expressive behavior that is deliberately communicated 
by a knower, or by witnessing the knower interacting with the stimulus and apparently 
enjoying (or disliking) the eǆpeƌieŶĐe. Eitheƌ ǁaǇ, the leaƌŶeƌ͛s eŵotioŶal ƌespoŶse to the 
stimulus is shaped by inferences made about the kŶoǁeƌ͛s appraisals. 
 
A final point is that we believe that there is another potentially important difference 
between social referencing and social appraisal that is not explicitly mentioned in either 
paper, namely the circumstances under which these phenomena take place. Social 
referencing is likely to be used in situations that are novel and the individual is seen to need 
otheƌs͛ appƌaisals to help him or her to disambiguate the situation. In the classic social 
referencing context, the kŶoǁeƌ͛s appƌaisal ďeĐoŵes the Đhild͛s appƌaisal. In principle, 
social appraisal applies to a broader set of circumstances, having the potential to shape 
both initial appraisals of a stimulus and subsequent reappraisals. Thus passengers who are 
initially calm during a turbulent flight may become anxious when they hear the screams of a 
flight attendant, and students who are mildly disappointed with how their papers have been 
graded may become angry when exposed to felloǁ studeŶts͛ appraisals of unfairness. It is 
Ŷot that otheƌs͛ appƌaisals of the eǀeŶt aƌe adopted ďeĐause the passeŶgeƌs oƌ studeŶts are 
uncertain about how to appraise it; rather, otheƌs͛ appƌaisals seƌǀe to ŵodulate aŶ iŶitial 
appraisal. Thus social referencing is likely to occur early in the emotion process, whereas 
social appraisal could occur at virtually any stage. This is a subtle but potentially important 
difference when it comes to identifying the processes that are triggered when we are 
exposed to otheƌs͛ eŵotioŶs.  
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